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Do Countries Really Deviate from the Optimal Tax System? 
 
Cristian F. Sepulveda1 
September 2020 
Abstract 
One of the main goals of the literature on optimal tax systems is to reduce the gap 
between the highly stylized theory of optimal taxation and the practice of fiscal 
policy reform. Unfortunately, however, we know little about the extent to which 
the international experience follows the policy prescriptions derived from 
economic theory or how those policy prescriptions would change with economic 
development. Based on the standard theory of optimal tax systems, this paper 
predicts the possible effects of economic development on the optimal level and 
composition of tax revenue and empirically tests these predictions with yearly data 
on three tax instruments from countries at different stages of development. On 
average, as countries develop they are shown to collect more tax revenue and switch 
from regressive tax instruments, like the value added tax, to more progressive taxes 
that become more productive with development, like personal and corporate 
income taxes. 
Keywords: optimal tax system, marginal cost of funds, tax administration, 
redistribution 









Department of Economics, Farmingdale State College, State University of New York. Address: 2350 Broadhollow Road, 





This paper uses the standard theory of optimal tax systems to predict possible effects of 
economic development on the optimal level and composition of tax revenue, and tests 
empirically the predictions of the model with yearly data on total tax revenue and tax revenue 
collections from three tax instruments—the personal income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax 
(CIT), and the value added tax (VAT)—and from large samples of developed and developing 
countries.  
Economists are generally skeptical about the connection between tax theory and tax policy. For 
instance, Sørensen (2007, p.383) and Boadway (2012, p.2) argue that the contribution of optimal 
tax theory to tax policy is important, but the former observes that to many applied economists 
optimal taxation theory is so “technical and abstract” that have “little policy relevance;” while 
the latter recognizes that the connection between the two is “not direct” and “subtle.” In order to 
better inform tax policy decisions, the literature on optimal tax systems pays special attention to 
a number of variables that constrain tax policies in practice, like the costs of tax compliance, tax 
avoidance and evasion, and the costs of tax administration, collection and enforcement. 1 
Arguably, however, little is known about how the level of development affects the optimal tax 
system and whether countries follow the prescriptions derived from the theory of optimal tax 
systems.  
 
1 Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) offer a complete overview of the theory, which considers the administration and 
compliance costs of taxation, tax evasion, issues on auditing, tax remittance, and the use of tax policy instruments 




Most of the academic discussion about how optimal tax theory should translate into policy 
reforms seems to be inspired by the U.S. system and other developed economies. 2 Developing 
countries, in contrast, have received much less attention, and it is not yet clear how the optimal 
tax system should be designed when, for instance, institutions are immature and the tax 
administration agency has little technical and financial capacity to collect taxes. As pointed out 
by Casanegra de Jantscher (1990), “in developing countries tax administration is tax policy” 
(emphasis in the original). Slemrod (1990), Mayshar (1991) and Alm (1996) highlighted the 
importance of the costs faced by taxpayers and the tax collection agency for the design of the tax 
system. Later the literature on optimal tax systems has incorporated these and other insights but, 
to the best of my knowledge, none has attempted to explore how economic development alters 
the optimal level and composition of tax revenue. Related contributions, consistent with the 
findings of this paper albeit not within the framework provided by the literature on optimal tax 
systems, are Gordon and Li (2009) and Huang and Rios (2016). 3 The former argue that 
governments rely on bank records in order to enforce tax compliance, and that in poorer 
countries firms are more likely going to evade taxes by shifting to the informal sector. The 
greater threat of financial disintermediation limits the ability of governments in poorer countries 
to collect taxes, resulting in a relatively low share of tax revenue over GDP. Similarly, Huang 
and Rios (2016) argue developing countries rely more on consumption taxes because they are 
more enforceable than non-linear income taxes.  
 
2 See, for instance, Diamond and Saez (2011) and Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009) for discussions about the 
tax system in the United States, and the Mirrlees’ (2011) Review, which focuses on the tax system of the United 
Kingdom and it is intended to serve as a model of an optimal tax system for open developed economies.  
3 Kenny and Winer (2006) also study the composition of tax revenue sources around the world. A key difference is 




The model used in this paper is based on Slemrod and Yitzhaki’s (1996) decomposition of the 
marginal cost of funds into a marginal efficiency cost of funds and the Feldstein’s (1972) 
distributional characteristic. These two concepts summarize the efficiency and equity costs of 
marginal tax revenue, and thus allow to represent the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity and 
revenue yield, the three basic attributes that describe an optimal tax system (Alm 1996). In 
practice, provided that decision makers routinely face tradeoffs between efficiency, equity and 
revenue yield, we can expect the theory of optimal tax systems to have empirical relevance.  
The theoretical analysis in this paper suggest that, as long as economic development facilitates 
tax enforcement and thus makes tax collection agencies more effective in collecting tax revenue, 
as countries grow they tend to use more those tax instruments that allow for greater tax 
progressivity, like the PIT and the CIT. This can happen because other potentially more 
regressive tax instruments, like the VAT, are relatively easier to enforce and thus more easily 
implemented by poorer countries. 4 
The empirical analysis concludes that the practice of tax policy around the world roughly 
follows the prescriptions derived from the literature on optimal tax systems. In average, countries 
around the world do seem to take into account the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity and 
revenue yield in their tax policy decisions. Less developed countries rely more on the VAT, 
which is relatively efficient in terms of its capacity to produce a significant amount of tax 
revenue (Keen and Lockwood 2010) but regressive. When countries reach higher levels of 
development they are able to improve efficiency in the collection of progressive taxes, like the 
 
4 The VAT is commonly assumed to be regressive; however, Jenkins, Jenkins and Kuo (2006) show that certain 
characteristics of the tax, like formal or practical exemption of goods consumed by poor households, can possibly 
make it progressive. The discussion in this paper is based on the most common assumption that the VAT is 




PIT and the CIT, and choose to rely more on them. As a result of efficiency improvements and 
lower equity costs, total tax revenue is also shown to increase with economic development. 
Overall, the findings support the conclusion that the theoretical model is empirically relevant, as 
it describes empirical trade-offs between efficiency, equity and revenue yield.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the theoretical 
framework and derives the optimal conditions for the use of tax instruments. Section 3 presents 
four testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Model 
The model developed in this section is based on Mayshar (1991), Shaw, Slemrod and Whiting 
(2010) and Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) analyses of optimal taxation in the presence of costly 
tax administration. Some important modifications to their framework are made: All variables are 
defined in monetary terms and uncertainty is assumed away for simplicity; taxpayers can 
“safely” (without penalty or probability of getting caught) shelter a certain amount of taxes from 
the tax authorities. There are only two tax bases 𝑖, consumption 𝑐 (e.g. VAT) and income 𝑦 (e.g. 
PIT or CIT).  
2.1 Individual Taxpayer’s Decisions 
A taxpayer maximizes a quasiconcave utility function 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝐺), where 𝐺 is total government 
expenditure on public goods. Utility increases in 𝑐 and 𝐺, and decreases in 𝑦 due to the effort 
made to earn income (i.e. labor). Net after tax income 𝑦𝑛 is defined as 




where 𝑡𝑦 is the income tax rate, 𝑠𝑦 is the amount of income sheltered from the tax authorities (tax 
avoidance and tax evasion), 𝜎𝑦 the cost of sheltering income, and 𝑚𝑦 the cost of income tax 
compliance. 5 Sheltering costs are assumed to be an increasing function of the amount of income 
sheltered; tax collection efforts related with the income tax, 𝐷𝑦, which consists of government 
spending in tax administration, collection and enforcement of the tax; and average per capita 
income in the economy, 𝑌, which is used as a proxy for technological and institutional 
development. Tax compliance costs are assumed to be a positive function of 𝑦, reflecting a 
higher spending associated with greater tax burdens and additional sources of income. 
Consumption is subject to a tax rate 𝑡𝑐 and the taxpayer is able to shelter part of their 
consumption spending 𝑠𝑐 at a cost 𝜎𝑐. Considering the case in which taxpayers face no tax 
compliance costs for the consumption tax, then  
𝑐 = (1 − 𝑡𝑐)𝑦
𝑛 + 𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑐 − 𝜎𝑐(𝑠𝑐 , 𝐷𝑐 , 𝑌) ,   (2) 
where the sheltering cost is assumed to be a positive function of 𝑠𝑐, 𝐷𝑐, and 𝑌. 
If the income available after taxes and costs is fully spent on consumption, the taxpayer problem 
is to choose 𝑦, 𝑠𝑦 and 𝑠𝑐 to maximize their utility. The first order conditions are  
















= 𝑡𝑐        (3.c) 
 
5 Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) offer a complete overview of the theory, which considers the administration and 
compliance costs of taxation, tax evasion, issues on auditing, tax remittance, and the use of tax policy instruments 
different from the tax rate, like the breadth of the tax base and enforcement effort. 
5 See, for instance, Diamond and Saez (2011) and Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009) for discussions about the 
tax system in the United States, and the Mirrlees’ (2011) Review, which focuses on the tax system of the United 




For any interior solution, conditions (3.a-c) describe the optimal behavior of the individual in 
terms of tax rates, tax compliance costs and sheltering costs.  
2.2 Government Decisions with Identical Taxpayers 
Assume for a moment that taxpayers are homogeneous, such that a benevolent government 
chooses the tax rates 𝑡𝑦 and 𝑡𝑐 and the level of tax collection effort 𝐷𝑦 and 𝐷𝑐 in order to 
maximize a representative taxpayer’s utility. The presence of the optimal tax collection effort 
decisions in the model is justified by the fact that countries rarely have the ability to collect the 
tax burdens that comply exactly with the tax code. In practice, taxpayers’ tax compliance is 
deficient and the government has limited means to improve it.  
Total tax collections must be enough to cover the revenue requirement 𝐺, which is initially 
assumed to be exogenous, plus the cost of tax administration. The Lagrange for this problem can 
be written as 
𝐿 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝐺) + 𝜆[−𝐺 + 𝑡𝑦(𝑦 − 𝑠𝑦) + 𝑡𝑐(𝑦
𝑛 − 𝑠𝑐) − 𝐷𝑐 − 𝐷𝑦] 
Using (1), (2) and (3.a-c), the first order conditions for the optimal government choices of tax 








































 .    (4.b) 
The right hand side of these conditions correspond to the marginal efficiency cost of funds 
(𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹) associated to 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝑦, 𝑐, as defined by Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995). The numerator 
 
6 Kenny and Winer (2006) also study the composition of tax revenue sources around the world. A key difference is 




represents the marginal cost of taxation in terms of individual consumption forgone, and the 
denominator represents marginal tax revenue. As in Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014), marginal tax 
revenue is affected by sheltering responses to the tax rate. Other things equal, greater tax rates 
that increase the erosion of the tax base (𝜕𝑦∗/𝜕𝑡𝑖 < 0 and 𝜕𝑠𝑖
∗/𝜕𝑡𝑖 > 0) also increase the 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹. 
This scenario characterizes the typical positive relation between tax rate and the 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹.  
Moreover, assuming that the two taxes are associated with variable tax collection costs, the first 















































 .      (4.d) 
The right hand side of these conditions can be interpreted as the marginal efficiency cost of tax 
collection efforts.  
Note that the expressions in the left hand side of equations (4.a)-(4.d) are identical. This implies 
that the MECF of all tax instruments, including tax rates as well as tax collection efforts, must be 
equalized under the optimal tax system.7 Another implication is that, in order to obtain an 
optimal solution that requires the use of two or more tax instruments, then the MECF of these tax 
instruments must be increasing in the respective tax rates. Otherwise the solution would involve 
the use of only one tax instrument. 
 
7 The VAT is commonly assumed to be regressive; however, Jenkins, Jenkins and Kuo (2006) show that certain 
characteristics of the tax, like formal or practical exemption of goods consumed by poor households, can possibly 
make it progressive. The discussion in this paper is based on the most common assumption that the VAT is 




2.3 Government Decisions with Heterogeneous Taxpayers 
Now consider the case of heterogeneous taxpayers, in which distributional concerns become 
relevant to the government. Assume that there are 𝐻 taxpayers ℎ with different levels of income 
𝑦ℎ. The social welfare function is assumed to have the following form 
𝑊{𝑢1(𝑐1, 𝑦1, 𝐺), … , 𝑢𝐻(𝑐𝐻 , 𝑦𝐻 , 𝐺)} , 
and the budget constraint is thus given by 
𝐺 = ∑ 𝑡𝑦(𝑦
ℎ − 𝑦𝑒 − 𝑠𝑦
ℎ) + 𝑡𝑐(𝑦
𝑛ℎ − 𝑠𝑐
ℎ)𝐻ℎ=1 − 𝐷𝑐 − 𝐷𝑦 . 
For simplicity, we focus on the optimal government decision about 𝑡𝑦; analogous results can be 
obtained for 𝑡𝑐, 𝐷𝑦 and 𝐷𝑐. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier as 𝜇, the first order condition for 
the optimal income tax rate is 


























 ,   (5.a) 
In order to obtain the traditional measure of the marginal cost of funds we divide the two sides of 






ℎ=1 , which is the same 




 ;       (5.b) 
where 𝑀𝑆𝑊𝐶𝑡𝑦 is the marginal social welfare cost of rising one additional dollar of taxes, and 
𝑀𝑅𝑡𝑦 the marginal revenue obtained with a small change in 𝑡𝑦. Following Mayshar and Yitzhaki 
(1995), the marginal cost of funds is decomposed into the marginal efficiency cost of funds and 


















= 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑦 ∙ 𝐷𝐶𝑡𝑦 . (5.c) 
The value of the distributional characteristic increases when the burden of the tax falls more 
(less) heavily on individuals whose utilities from consumption are more (less) valuable for 
society. If a relatively high weight is assigned to the utility of the poor and the tax is progressive, 
then the distributional characteristic can be expected to be lower than one and get closer to zero 
as the progressivity increases; otherwise, if the tax is regressive the distributional characteristic 
can be greater than one.  
Note that the distributional characteristic depends on the distributional weights, which besides an 
idealized representation of societies preferences, could be interpreted –from a more positive (less 
normative) perspective– as the distributional preferences of the decision maker. Government 
authorities may have their own preferences for redistribution, which may be shaped by political 
economy considerations like their interest to increase the probability of reelection. This is 
important because it implies that the distributional characteristic does not necessarily depend on 
the actual income inequalities of a country.  
An analogous expression of the marginal cost of funds can be obtained for the consumption tax 
rate, and it is also possible to obtain the marginal cost of tax collection efforts. Notwithstanding 
this fact, for the sake of simplicity the following discussion will focus especially on the marginal 
efficiency cost of funds and distributional characteristics associated with the tax rates 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑦.  
Figure 1 illustrates how the optimal tax mix is obtained under this model. The vertical axis 
represents marginal costs of tax revenue collection and the horizontal axis the amount of tax 
revenue 𝑅𝑡𝑖 collected with each tax rate 𝑡𝑖. An internal solution with multiple tax instruments 𝑖 




distributional characteristic, and assuming that 𝑅𝑡𝑖 increases with 𝑡𝑖, this implies that the 
marginal efficiency cost of funds of each tax rate 𝑖, 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑖, is also increasing in 𝑅𝑡𝑖.  
An optimal tax system is characterized by the presence of a unique optimal marginal cost of 
funds 𝑀𝐶𝐹∗ describing the marginal cost under each of the tax instruments used. Assume for 
simplicity that the optimal marginal cost of funds 𝑀𝐶𝐹∗ has already been determined, and that 
the functions describing the marginal efficiency cost of funds of 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑦 are identical, and 
represented by 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑖. In general, tax instruments that redistribute more in the decision maker’s 
desired direction will be used more intensively. For instance, if the consumption of the poor is 
regarded as more relevant, and if an income tax increase is progressive while a consumption tax 
increase is regressive, then it should be the case that 𝐷𝐶𝑡𝑐 > 1 > 𝐷𝐶𝑡𝑦, and thus also that, for 
any given amount of tax revenue, 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑐 > 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑦. Under these assumptions a country would 
choose to rely more on the income tax, such that 𝑅𝑡𝑐
∗ < 𝑅𝑡𝑦
∗ .  
Figure 1. Optimal Composition of Tax Revenue. 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑡𝑦< 1  















It is apparent that total tax revenue depends on the marginal cost of funds of the tax system, 
which in turn depends on the distributional effects and the efficiency of each tax instrument. As 
suggested by Alm (1996), therefore, the appropriate design of tax systems involves trade-offs 
between equity, efficiency and revenue yield.  
3. Testable Hypotheses 
Even though the behavioral responses to tax policy, the costs of tax compliance, tax shielding 
and tax administration are generally unknown and can vary considerably across countries, the 
model described in the previous section can be used to identify four testable hypotheses about 
the effect of tax rates and development on the level and composition of tax revenue: 
Hypothesis 1: Decreasing marginal effect of tax rates on own tax revenue (positive slope of 
𝑴𝑬𝑪𝑭𝒕𝒊 function). A necessary condition for an internal solution with two or more tax 
instruments is that, for any given distributional characteristic, the marginal efficiency cost of 
funds of each 𝑡𝑖 should increase with tax revenue 𝑅𝑡𝑖. This relationship is represented by the 
positive slope of 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑖 in Figure 1; it implies that marginal tax revenue 𝑀𝑅𝑡𝑖 is decreasing in 
𝑅𝑡𝑖, and that subsequent increases in the tax rate 𝑡𝑖 will lead to a reduction in own marginal tax 
revenue 𝑀𝑅𝑡𝑖.  Evidence in support of hypothesis 1 would imply that this necessary condition for 
an internal solution is satisfied in practice, such that the model can validly be used to explain the 
size and composition of tax revenue.  
Hypothesis 2: Positive effect of economic development on own marginal tax revenue 
(downward shift of each 𝑴𝑬𝑪𝑭𝒕𝒊 function). Provided that economic development increases the 
size of the tax bases, and is accompanied with institutional and technological improvements that 




expected (although not with certainty) to increase marginal revenue at any given tax rate and for 
any tax instrument.  
Economic development is typically accompanied with higher individual income, improved 
technology, and institutional development. Improved technology and institutional development 
can be expected to reduce the tax collection costs due to, for instance, a greater proportion of 
transactions and activities registered in the formal economy, more skilled personnel and 
efficiency gains available to the tax agency. The empirical section will provide some evidence 
for this assumption. For now, note that a technologically advanced tax collection agency may be 
better able to reduce tax compliance costs and the share of the tax base that is sheltered by the 
taxpayers. This is especially relevant for taxes that require a great deal of data collection and 
processing, like the income taxes. In Figure 1, the reduction of tax collection costs, tax 
compliance costs and tax avoidance can be represented by a downward shift of 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑖. 
Hypothesis 3: Positive effect of economic development on total tax revenue (reduction of 
𝑴𝑪𝑭∗). Provided that economic development helps to increase marginal tax revenue for some 
tax instruments (hypothesis 2), and assuming that the demand for public expenditure is 
exogenous and downward sloping, then economic development allows to reduce the optimal 
marginal cost of funds 𝑀𝐶𝐹∗ at the national level and thus also to increase the optimal amount of 
total tax revenue. Moreover, in line with Casanegra de Jantscher (1990), less developed 
countries—which presumably have more limited information about tax bases, suffer from 
deficient (more expensive) technologies at the government and personal levels, and may even 
have weaker institutions—can be expected to have more room to increase tax revenues by 
making changes to administration, collection and enforcement efforts. The last point suggests 




Similarly, the optimal amount of total tax revenue may also increase if economic development 
allows to better target taxpayers’ income and thus reduce the value of the distributional 
characteristics. When economic development is accompanied with greater consumption for 
individuals of all income levels, then if the marginal utility of consumption is diminishing, the 
value of distributional characteristic will likely decrease for some tax instruments, leading to an 
increase in the optimal amount of total tax revenue. In addition, the value of the distributional 
characteristic of a tax increases if tax compliance costs are regressive and countries assign 
greater weights to the marginal utility of the poor. There is a growing literature concerned with 
the costs that taxation imposes on individual and corporate taxpayers. Estimates of tax 
compliance costs for the United States can be found in Fichtner and Feldman (2013). Coolidge 
(2012) provides a review of empirical findings about tax compliance costs for firms in developed 
and developing countries. Many of the conclusions of these studies are country specific, but 
some general findings are useful for this discussion. For instance, regressive tax compliance 
costs are a clear finding in both developed and developing countries, and regressivity seems to be 
worse in the latter. Evans (2008) concludes that compliance costs are generally significant, 
regressive and non-decreasing over time, and Barbone, Bird and Vazquez-Caro (2012) discuss 
additional evidence that support these conclusions. Based on tax compliance studies in South 
Africa, Yemen, Peru and Ukraine, Coolidge (2010) shows that compliance costs of firms are 
relatively fixed, representing minor burdens for large firms but very significant burdens for small 
firms. At the cross-country level, these findings suggest that development reduces the relative 
importance of tax compliance costs and thus tends to reduce the value of distributional 




This hypothesis provides a complementary explanation to the wide array of existing theories 
about the size of government, most of which are focused on demand-side political economy 
considerations.8  
Hypothesis 4: Effect of economic development on tax revenue composition. Provided that 
economic development helps to increase marginal tax revenue and to reduce the value of the 
distributional characteristic of some the tax instruments available, then greater levels of 
development will be associated with a more intensive use of those tax instruments.  
In particular, the tax instruments whose marginal tax revenue increases with economic 
development will be identified by the empirical analysis of hypothesis 2.  
Identifying the tax instruments whose distributional characteristics decrease with economic 
development is, unfortunately, not possible with the available data. To overcome this limitation, 
the empirical analysis proceeds under two assumptions. One is that direct taxes like the PIT and 
the CIT allow for higher degrees of progressivity, and that indirect taxes like the VAT are more 
regressive. The other assumption is that higher income inequalities are considered undesirable by 
the decision makers, such that they increase the value of the distributional characteristics. Based 
on these assumptions, the model predicts that as countries develop they will use the PIT and CIT 
more and move away from the VAT.  
Even without advanced technologies and limited tax enforcement capacity, less developed 
countries can rely on the VAT to collect significant amounts of tax revenue. Indeed, the VAT has 
been referred to as a “money machine” due to its power to increase tax revenue collection (Keen 
 
8 The best known theory about the effects of development on government size is the so called Wagner’s law, which 
states that the relative size of government increases with real GDP per capita due to the greater complexity of 
government functions and the luxurious nature of public goods and services. See Shelton (2007) and Funashima 




and Lockwood 2010), and it is well known that less developed countries rely more on this tax 
instrument in spite of its regressive effects (Huang and Rios 2016). When countries develop, 
however, the model suggests that they will partially replace the VAT with more progressive tax 
instruments. 
4. Data and Empirical Analysis 
This section provides empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses presented in the previous 
section. The data consists of two unbalanced panels. Database I, based mainly on the USAID 
Collecting Taxes database, provides more cross country information and covers up to 154 
countries during the period 2008-2013. Database II, based on Vegh and Vuletin (2015) and 
IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Data set (WoRLD), covers up to 140 countries during a 
longer period of time: 1990-2017. The subsamples used vary in terms of the number of countries 
and observations, which have been maximized as allowed by data availability but in some case 
some observations have been dropped to ensure comparability of results.9  
4.1 Data Description  
The empirical analysis focuses on three major sources of tax revenue, the personal income tax 
(PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT), and the value added tax (VAT). Tables 1A and 1B (see 
Appendix 4) present the summary statistics of the variables from Database I and Database II, 
respectively. The main independent variable is the (natural) log of GDP per capita, expressed in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) of 2011 US dollars, which is used to represent the level of 
development and the non-linear relationship effects that this variable is expected to have on the 
size and composition of tax revenue.10 The (natural) log of population is included in all 
 
9 Appendix 2 contains the lists of countries considered in each database and the subsamples used in the different 
econometric specifications. 




regression to isolate scale effects not explicitly captured by the optimality conditions presented 
in Section 2. With few exceptions, other controls are excluded because they either severely 
reduce the number of observations or are highly correlated with log of GDP per capita. Although 
statistically costly, their exclusion has been necessary to ensure that log of GDP per capita can 
fully display its explanatory power in a complex analysis that consists of several regressions (11 
different dependent variables, some evaluated with the two databases, and different income 
groups and econometric models) that need to be interpreted jointly. In this context, in order to 
control for common international trends and unobserved heterogeneity, all panel data regressions 
include year dummies (not shown) and either regional or country fixed effects. 
The dependent variables in the analysis of hypotheses 1 and 2 are the marginal tax revenues of 
alternative tax instruments, represented here by changes in the productivity measures of the three 
tax instruments. The productivity of a tax instrument is defined as the average tax revenue 
collected (as percent of GDP) for each percent point of the tax rate.11 For instance, VAT 
productivity is computed as total VAT collections as percent of GDP divided by the standard 
VAT rate. A reduction (increase) of average tax revenue per percentage point of the tax rate 
implies that marginal revenue is decreasing (increasing) in the tax rate. The data show that the 
average productivity of the PIT tends to increase with the level of development. For the CIT and 
the VAT low income countries display, in average, lower productivities, but there is no clear 
trend across income groups.  
 
11 This measure is also considered as a proxy for efficiency. For instance, Aizenmana and Jinjara (2008) use it as a 
proxy for the efficiency of the VAT. This interpretation is consistent with the definition of the marginal efficiency 
cost of funds in expressions (4.a-b) and (5.b-c). 
14 Regressions (1.a-b) are sensitive to the inclusion of the interaction term between GDP per capita and the low 
income dummy. If this variable is excluded, the coefficient of the growth rate of GDP per capita becomes 




Important control variables used to test hypotheses 1 and 2 are the tax rates (maximum or 
standard) of the PIT, CIT and VAT, which do not appear to vary systematically across income 
groups. 
The dependent variables used to analyze hypotheses 3 and 4 are total tax revenue as a percent of 
the GDP; tax revenue collected by the PIT, CIT and VAT as percentages of total tax revenue 
(only in Database I), and as percentages of de GDP. Again, only the PIT appears to have a clear 
tendency to increase as a percentage of both total tax revenue and the GDP when the level of 
development goes up. 
Additional controls included in Database I are tax administration costs, defined as total costs of 
administering the tax system as a percent of tax revenue; large taxpayer unit, a dummy that takes 
the value of 1 if the country has an agency specialized in large taxpayers, and 0 otherwise; SARA, 
a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country has a semi-autonomous revenue agency, and 0 
otherwise; and the Gini coefficient, which is defined between 0 and 100 and increases with the 
extent of income inequalities.  
4.2 Analysis of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
We first focus on the regression results pertaining hypotheses 1 and 2. The dependent variables 
are given by the tax productivity measures, which are used as proxies of marginal tax revenue. 
Tables 2A and 2B show the results obtained with Database I, while Table 2C presents the results 
obtained with Database II (see Appendix 4). In general, we are not interested only on statistically 
significant results; no statistical significance can be equally informative. 
The regressions in Table 2A are based on the Random-Effects Generalized Least Squared model. 
Given that the time period is relatively short, within country variations of tax policy instruments 




to exploit the cross-country variation of these variables. Regional dummies are added to partially 
control for unobserved fixed effects. Standard errors of all regressions are robust to cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity and clustered by country, thus also robust to within-panel serial 
correlation. Each econometric specification is evaluated with the full set of observations 
available, as well as with the alternative income groups.  
The effects of tax rates on tax productivity are consistent with hypothesis 1. An increase in the 
maximum PIT rate has a negative and significant effect on PIT productivity in the full sample 
(regression 1) and within income groups (regressions 2-4), implying that marginal revenue of the 
PIT decreases with the tax rate. Similar results are found for the CIT and VAT (regressions 5-
12), although the negative effects of the CIT are not obtained for high income countries 
(regression 8). These results are consistent with upward sloping 𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹 functions for the three 
tax instruments.  
Economic development, represented by the log of GDP per capita, has a positive effect on the 
productivity of the PIT and CIT in the full sample regressions (1 and 5), supporting hypothesis 2 
for these two tax instruments. For the PIT the effect is significant at the 5% level and for the CIT 
at the 1% level. However, for the VAT the relationship is not statistically significant. The effects 
within income-groups vary widely across tax instruments. For the PIT, a positive and significant 
effect of development is verified only within the high income group (regression 4), suggesting 
that as development increases within this group there is a significant shift downward of its 
𝑀𝐸𝐶𝐹 function. For the CIT, a similar shift is verified only among low income countries 
(regression 6). For the VAT, development has the opposite effect among middle and high income 




Table 2B presents the regression results obtained under the Dynamic panel data model System 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments). This model is appropriate for panel data with few 
(less than 10) periods and a large number of countries in which fixed effects can be of 
importance. The inclusion of autocorrelation terms (coefficients not shown) and the instruments’ 
requirements lead to a reduction in the number of observations. Nevertheless, the previous 
results are mostly confirmed. Tax rates appear to have negative marginal effects on their 
respective productivity measures. Interestingly, and similar to what was obtained in Table 2A, 
regression (9), the CIT rate appears to have a negative effect on VAT productivity, suggesting 
that higher CIT rates may be eroding the tax base of the VAT. Regarding hypothesis 2, the level 
of development has a positive effect on the productivity of the PIT and CIT. An additional 
control variable, defined as the level of development only for low and lower-middle countries 
(and 0 otherwise), is included to capture possible differences in the effect of development on 
marginal tax revenue between lower and higher income countries. The coefficient of this variable 
is significant only in regression (2), and shows that the effect of development on marginal tax 
revenue of the CIT is higher in lower income countries. 
Table 2C presents the results obtained with Database II. A longer period of up to 28 years 
provides greater within-country variation, allowing for more meaningful estimates of causal 
within-country effects under the Fixed-Effects model. These regressions include autoregressive 
terms to control for serial autocorrelation. In addition, in regressions (1)-(3) the log of GDP per 
capita, which possesses a unit root, is replaced by its first difference, which is stationary. The 
first difference in the natural logarithm is approximately equal to the growth rate of a variable. In 
order to make sure that this conceptual change does not distort the interpretation of the results, 




capita. The results under the two specifications are largely consistent. Again, hypothesis 1 is 
strongly confirmed and hypothesis 2 is confirmed only partially. After controlling for possible 
different effects of development in low and lower-middle income countries, the ‘growth rate’ of 
GDP per capita appears to have a negative effect on the marginal tax revenue of the PIT. This 
result is unexpected, and it may be related with the greater ability of higher income individuals to 
avoid or evade the PIT. In the case of the CIT, hypothesis 2 is confirmed regardless the level of 
development, but there is no evidence suggesting that the level of development affects the 
productivity of the VAT. The latter result, which is largely consistent across Tables 2A, 2B and 
2C, suggests that less developed countries may face no systematic disadvantage in the collection 
of the VAT. 
Another interesting result is the positive cross base effects between the PIT and the CIT. The PIT 
rate has a positive effect on CIT productivity and the CIT rate has a positive effect on PIT 
productivity. This may be explained by optimizing behavior of taxpayers, who faced with one 
higher tax rate may try to switch to another income source, increasing the tax base and the 
productivity of the latter. It is important to acknowledge that differences with respect to the 
previous results may be influenced by both the longer time period and the smaller sample of 
countries.  
As discussed, positive effects of development on tax productivity can be partially explained by 
administration cost savings due to technological and institutional improvements. Table 3 (see 
Appendix 4) provides evidence about the effect of development on tax administration costs, 
measured as a percent of tax revenue. Unfortunately, the number of observations available is not 
large and less developed countries are underrepresented; thus the results obtained are far from 




sample and two income groups; regional dummies are omitted because they render the variables 
of interest irrelevant. Regressions (4) and (5) present Dynamic System GMM coefficients for the 
full sample of countries, without and with regional controls, respectively. The share of tax 
revenue used to cover tax administration costs is shown to decrease as the level of development 
goes up. This effect is observed in the full sample regressions (1), (4) and (5), as well as the low 
and low-middle income group in regression (2). The evidence about the relevance of the other 
controls is not robust. Only for the low and low-middle income group the presence of a large 
taxpayer unit helps to reduce administration costs. The presence of semi-autonomous tax 
collection agency appear to be relevant to explain administration costs only in the dynamic 
model. Development and the other controls have very little explanatory power among high and 
upper-middle income countries, as suggested by regression (3).  
In general, the results in Table 3 suggest that development does lead to lower administration 
costs, especially in less developed countries. This may be one reason behind the positive effect 
of development on tax productivity obtained in support of hypothesis 2 for the PIT (under some 
specifications) and the CIT. 
4.3 Analysis of Hypotheses 3 and 4 
Tables 4A and 4B (see Appendix 4) present the regressions testing hypotheses 3 and 4, using 
Database I. Table 4A presents a simple cross-country analysis intended to compare tax policy 
choices made at different level of development, but not necessarily implemented timely in 
response to economic growth. In order to minimize the influence of short-term business-cycle 
effects, all variables are defined as averages for the period 2008-2013. This analysis is based on 
Database I because it provides information for a greater number of countries; however, similar 




The results provide strong evidence in support of hypothesis 3. Regressions (1.a-b) and (5.a-b) 
show that the level of development has a positive and significant effect on total tax revenue. This 
result is robust to the functional form used (log or quadratic), and the inclusion of regional 
effects. The conclusion of a positive effect of development is reinforced by the importance of 
regional effects, shown to be significant and mostly negative with respect to the base group, 
Western Europe, which consists only of high income countries.  
In particular, regressions (5.a-b) attempt to capture the role of the distributional components. If it 
is true that development allows countries to better target the preferred income distribution with 
progressive tax instruments and move away from regressive taxes, then the resultant lower value 
of distributional components would increase the optimal amount of total tax revenue. In this 
context, greater inequalities leading to a greater switch toward progressive tax instruments would 
have a positive effect on total tax revenue. This is the result obtained in regression (5.a), 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of the interaction term between development and the 
Gini coefficient is negative, suggesting that the value of the distributional characteristic decreases 
more slowly, or maybe that the need for redistribution is smaller, at higher levels of 
development.  
The other regressions in Table 4A focus on tax revenue composition. According to hypothesis 4, 
economic development allows countries to substitute away from the VAT, and increase tax 
revenue collections from the PIT and CIT (as a percentage of total tax revenue). These 
predictions are soundly confirmed for the case of the PIT, but not for the CIT, and only partially 
for the VAT. The significant negative effect of development on relative VAT collections is 
robust to the use of different non-linear functional forms and regional effects (4.a-b), but not to 




Table 4B presents a panel analysis based on Database I. Again, the models used are Random-
Effects GLS and Dynamic System GMM. In line with hypothesis 3, regressions (1) and (5) show 
that economic development has a positive effect on the share of tax revenue over GDP. This 
conclusion is also reinforced by the sign and significance of the regional dummies. In both 
regressions all the coefficients of regional dummies have a negative sign and are significant at 
least at the 5% level. Since the base group, Western Europe, consists of high income countries, 
the negative sign means in several cases that countries with lower levels of development have a 
lower share of tax revenue over GDP.  
The effects of economic development on revenue composition, this time defined with respect to 
the GDP instead of total tax revenue (to be able to associate the results with those in Tables 2A 
and 2B), are estimated by the regressions (2)-(4) and (6)-(8). The log of GDP per capita has a 
positive and significant effect, at the 5% level, on the PIT share only under the Dynamic System 
GMM model in regression (6); however, both regressions (2) and (6) show negative signs and 
significance of the regional controls, suggesting that development does have a positive effect of 
on the relative use of the PIT. For the case of the CIT, development has a more robust positive 
effect; and for the case of the VAT development is shown to have no discernible effect on its 
relative importance.  
Importantly, note that the last results are consistent with the results obtained in Tables 2A and 
2B: The effect of development on the shares of the three tax instruments is positively related to 
its effects on their productivity. This means that, as countries develop, they appear to increase 
more the use of those tax instruments that become more productive. This conclusion provides 
evidence in support not only of hypothesis 4, but also of the framework described in section 2, in 




Table 4C (see Appendix 4) presents the results obtained with Database II and the Fixed-Effects 
model. Regressions (1)-(5) use data from all countries and regressions (6)-(10) from low and 
lower-middle income countries. The growth of per capita GDP appears to have a positive effect 
on total tax revenue, providing additional support for hypothesis 3, but significant effects are 
only obtained in regressions (2.a-b) and (7.a-b), where the sample is restricted (for comparability 
purposes) to those observations also available for the PIT and CIT cases.  
Hypothesis 4, focused on the effects of economic development on revenue composition, is 
evaluated by regressions (3)-(5) and (8)-(10). The growth rate of GDP per capita has a clear 
positive and significant effect only on the CIT share, although the effect appears to be smaller for 
low income countries. The share of the PIT does not increase with the growth rate of GDP per 
capita, implying that in average countries did not take advantage of the potential progressivity of 
this tax during the period 1990-2017. Finally, and consistent with the results from Table 4B, the 
VAT share does not appear to change with economic development. 
Overall, the empirical results partially confirm hypotheses 3 and 4. Total tax revenue is shown to 
increase in most specifications with the level of development, while the choice of specific tax 
instruments is very consistent with the effects of development on their tax productivities. 
5. Conclusions 
The theory of optimal tax systems incorporates key constraints to the tax policy decisions, 
including tax avoidance and evasion, the costs of tax compliance, and the costs of tax 
administration, collection and enforcement. The inclusion of these variables allows to add 
practical relevance to the discussion of the optimal tax problem, and to explicitly describe the 




attempts to verify if the theory can be used describe actual tax policy decisions, and how 
economic development affects the optimal tax system.  
This paper analyzes the optimal conditions for the implementation of an optimal tax system, and 
contributes with four empirical results. First, the productivity of the three tax instruments 
analyzed decreases with the tax rate. This finding confirms the theoretical prediction about the 
positive slope of the marginal cost of funds of tax revenue sources. The paper also reaches three 
conclusions about the effects of development on the optimal tax system. First, economic 
development leads to efficiency gains in the collection of the personal income tax and the 
corporate income tax, but not in the collection of the value added tax. Second, these efficiency 
gains seem to reduce the overall marginal cost of funds of the system, leading to an increase in 
the optimal level of public expenditure and thus also to greater tax revenue collections. Third, 
optimal tax revenue composition depends on efficiency and equity considerations that vary with 
the level of development. Less developed countries rely more on the VAT in spite of its 
regressive effects, because it offers a great tax revenue potential that does not depend on the 
level of development. In contrast, higher income countries rely more on the PIT, likely because it 
allows for greater tax progressivity. Finally, increases in GDP per capita appear to increase both 
the productivity and the use of the CIT regardless the level of development.  
The theory of optimal tax systems is shown to be remarkably effective in describing and 
predicting the level and composition of tax revenue across countries at different levels of 
development. The analysis presented in this paper provides empirical support to this theory, 
which is shown to have applications not previously exploited in the literature. However, much 
remains to be done in order to advance our understanding of optimal tax systems and the 




paper largely consisted of verbal arguments based on findings of the literature. A more rigorous 
derivation based, for instance, in comparative static analysis, may shed light on additional 
relevant determinants and functional relationships. The empirical analysis presented in this paper 
could also be improved significantly with the use of a large and balanced panel database. This 
may facilitate the inclusion of additional controls, which would help understanding the channels 
through which economic development affects the level and composition of tax revenue. Finally, 
the paper focuses exclusively on the optimal tax system, but it does not explore the conditions 
that may induce countries to deviate from it. A careful consideration of these conditions may 
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Appendix 1.A. Derivation of (4.a)-(4.d) 
The first order condition for 𝑡𝑦 is  





















] = 0 ,  (A.1)  
where, based on (1) and using (3.b), 
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Using also (3.a), condition (A.1) can be reduced to 
  −(1 − 𝑡𝑐)(𝑦 − 𝑠𝑦)
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 , which is equal to (4.a).  
  Similarly, the first order condition for 𝑡𝑐 is  
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Using (3.a) and (3.c) this expression can be reduced to 
  −(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑠𝑐)
𝜕𝑢
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 , which is equal to (4.b).  
  The first order condition for the optimal choice of 𝐷𝑦 is  

























































 , which is equal to (4.c). 
  Finally, the first order condition for 𝐷𝑐 is  
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Appendix 1.B. Derivation of (5.a)  
Incorporating the exempted level of income (1) must be redefined for each taxpayer ℎ as 
  𝑦𝑛ℎ = (1 − 𝑡𝑦)𝑦
ℎ + 𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑦
ℎ − 𝜎𝑦(𝑠𝑦
ℎ, 𝐷𝑦, 𝑌) − 𝑚𝑦(𝑦
ℎ) . 










 .        (A.3) 
Considering these equalities as well as the problem described by (5) and (6), the first order 
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Appendix 2. Lists of Countries 
   Low income Lower-middle income Upper-middle income High income 
Symbols & region codes: # RC country  RC country  RC country  RC country  
  1 5 Bangladesh *  ^ / † ‡ 2 Albania *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Argentina * + ^ / † ‡ 3 Ant. & Barbuda *   / † ‡ 
*  Tables 2A and 2B 2 6 Benin *   / † ‡ 4 Algeria *   / †  3 Belize *   / † ‡ 1 Australia * + ^ / † ‡ 
+  Table 2C 3 6 Burkina Faso *   / † ‡ 6 Angola      ‡ 6 Botswana *  ^ / † ‡ 7 Austria * + ^ / † ‡ 
^  Table 3 4 6 Burundi    / † ‡ 2 Armenia *   / † ‡ 3 Brazil *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Bahamas, The     †  
/  Table 4A or / if also  5 1 Cambodia *   / † ‡ 2 Azerbaijan * +  / † ‡ 2 Bulgaria * + ^ / † ‡ 3 Barbados * +  / † ‡ 
  in regs. (5)-(8) 6 6 Central Af. Rep. *   / † ‡ 2 Belarus *   / † ‡ 3 Chile * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Belgium * + ^ / † ‡ 
†  Table 4B 7 6 Chad *   / †  5 Bhutan   ^ / † ‡ 3 Costa Rica * +  / † ‡ 8 Canada * + ^ / † ‡ 
‡  Table 4C 8 6 Comoros       3 Bolivia * +    ‡ 2 Croatia *  ^ / † ‡ 4 Cyprus *  ^ / † ‡ 
  Reg. (1) of Table 4C 9 6 Congo, D. Rep.      ‡ 2 Bosnia Herz. *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Dominica *   / † ‡ 7 Czech Republic * + ^ / † ‡ 
  includes all countries 10 6 Cote d'Ivoire *   / † ‡ 6 Cameroon *   / † ‡ 6 Equat. Guinea *   / † ‡ 7 Denmark * + ^ / † ‡ 
  11 6 Ethiopia * +  / † ‡ 6 Cape Verde *   / † ‡ 6 Gabon       2 Estonia *  ^ / † ‡ 
  12 6 Gambia, The *   / † ‡ 1 China * +  / † ‡ 3 Grenada *   / † ‡ 7 Finland * + ^ / † ‡ 
RC:  Region Codes 13 6 Ghana * +  / † ‡ 3 Colombia * + ^ / † ‡ 2 Hungary * + ^ / † ‡ 7 France * + ^ / † ‡ 
1:  East Asia & Pacific 14 6 Guinea      ‡ 6 Congo, Rep. *   / † ‡ 2 Kazakhstan *   / † ‡ 7 Germany * + ^ / † ‡ 
2:  Cent.Europe & Cent.Asia 15 6 Guinea-Bissau     †  4 Djibouti    /   2 Latvia * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Greece * + ^ / † ‡ 
3:  Lat.America & Carib. 16 3 Haiti *   / †  3 Dom. Republic * +  / † ‡ 4 Lebanon *   / †  1 Hong Kong (Ch)    / † ‡ 
4:  Mid.East & North Africa 17 5 India *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Ecuador *   / †  2 Lithuania * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Iceland *  ^ / † ‡ 
5:  South Asia 18 6 Kenya * +  / † ‡ 4 Egypt *   / † ‡ 1 Malaysia *  ^ / † ‡ 7 Ireland *  ^ / † ‡ 
6:  Sub-Saharan Africa 19 2 Kyrgyz Rep. *   / † ‡ 3 El Salvador * + ^ / † ‡ 6 Mauritius * + ^ / † ‡ 4 Israel *   / † ‡ 
7:  Western Europe (base) 20 1 Lao PDR *   / †  1 Fiji * + ^ / † ‡ 3 Mexico * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Italy * + ^ / † ‡ 
8:  United States & Canada 21 6 Liberia *   / † ‡ 2 Georgia * +  / † ‡ 2 Montenegro *   / †  1 Japan * + ^ / † ‡ 
  22 6 Madagascar *   / † ‡ 3 Guatemala *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Panama *   / † ‡ 1 Korea, Rep. * + ^ / † ‡ 
  23 6 Malawi *   / † ‡ 3 Honduras * + ^ / † ‡ 2 Poland *  ^ / † ‡ 4 Kuwait       
  24 6 Mali *   / † ‡ 1 Indonesia *  ^ / † ‡ 2 Romania * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Luxembourg * + ^ / † ‡ 
  25 6 Mauritania *   / †  4 Iran, Is. Rep. * +  / † ‡ 2 Russian Fed. * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Malta * + ^ / † ‡ 
  26 1 Mongolia *  ^ / † ‡ 3 Jamaica * +  / † ‡ 2 Serbia *   / † ‡ 7 Netherlands *  ^ / † ‡ 
  27 6 Mozambique *  ^ / † ‡ 4 Jordan *  ^ / † ‡ 6 Seychelles *   / † ‡ 1 New Zealand * + ^ / † ‡ 
  28 5 Nepal *   / † ‡ 6 Lesotho *   / † ‡ 2 Slovak Republic *  ^ / † ‡ 7 Norway * + ^ / † ‡ 
  29 6 Niger *   / † ‡ 2 Macedonia *   / † ‡ 6 South Africa * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Portugal * + ^ / † ‡ 
  30 6 Nigeria *   / †  5 Maldives    / †  3 St.Kitts & Nevis    / † ‡ 4 Qatar       
  31 5 Pakistan *   / † ‡ 2 Moldova *  ^ / † ‡ 3 St. Lucia *   / † ‡ 1 Singapore *  ^ / † ‡ 
  32 6 Rwanda *  ^ / † ‡ 4 Morocco *   / † ‡ 3 St. Vinc. & Gre. *   / † ‡ 2 Slovenia *  ^ / † ‡ 
  33 6 Senegal *   / † ‡ 6 Namibia * +  / † ‡ 2 Turkey * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Spain * + ^ / † ‡ 
  34 6 Sierra Leone *   / † ‡ 3 Nicaragua *   / †  3 Uruguay * + ^ / † ‡ 7 Sweden * + ^ / † ‡ 
  35 6 Sao Tome & Pr.       3 Paraguay * +  / † ‡ 3 Venezuela, RB    / †  7 Switzerland * + ^ / † ‡ 
  36 6 Sudan    / † ‡ 3 Peru * + ^ / † ‡         1 Taiwan, China *   / †  
  37 2 Tajikistan *   / † ‡ 1 Philippines * + ^ / † ‡         3 Trin. & Tobago *   / † ‡ 
  38 6 Tanzania * +  / † ‡ 5 Sri Lanka *  ^ / † ‡         4 U.Arab Emir.     †  
  39 6 Togo *   / † ‡ 3 Suriname *   / † ‡         7 United Kingdom * + ^ / † ‡ 
  40 6 Uganda *  ^ / † ‡ 6 Swaziland *   / † ‡         8 United States   ^ / † ‡ 
  41 2 Uzbekistan *   / †  4 Syrian Ar. Rep.    /                   
  42 1 Vietnam *  ^ / † ‡ 1 Thailand * + ^ / † ‡                 
  43 4 West Bank Gaza *    †  4 Tunisia *   / † ‡                 
  44 4 Yemen, Rep. *   / † ‡ 2 Turkmenistan                       
  45 6 Zambia * +  / † ‡ 2 Ukraine *   / † ‡                 
  46 6 Zimbabwe *  ^ / † ‡                         




Appendix 3. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Real GDP Output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in mil. 2011 US$) Penn World Table, version 9.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2015) 
Population  Population (in millions). Penn World Table, version 9.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2015) 
PIT Productivity Database I: Actual personal income tax revenue as a percent of GDP 
divided by the average PIT rate. The average PIT rate is a weighted 
average of the lowest and highest marginal PIT rates, with weights equal to 
the levels of income at which these rates begin to apply.  
USAID Collecting Taxes 
 Database II: Actual PIT revenue as a percent of GDP divided by the 
maximum PIT rate. 
Computed with data from Vegh & 
Vuletin (2015) and IMF’s WoRLD 
CIT Productivity It represents how well the corporate income tax produces revenue, given 
the prevailing tax rate. It is obtained by dividing the ratio of total CIT 
revenues to GDP by the general CIT rate.  
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: Computed with data from 
Vegh & Vuletin (2015) and IMF’s 
WoRLD 
VAT Productivity VAT receipts as % of GDP divided by the standard VAT rate. Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes  
Database II: Computed with data from 
Vegh & Vuletin (2015) and IMF’s 
WoRLD 
PIT Maximum Rate Highest tax rate applied under the PIT system on income above level at 
which the PIT begin to apply. 
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: Vegh & Vuletin (2015) 
CIT Rate Rate of the corporate income tax. In most countries, only one CIT rate is 
applied to corporate profits. In addition, in most countries, owners of sole 
proprietorships or unincorporated partnerships pay personal income taxes 
and not corporate income taxes. 
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: Vegh & Vuletin (2015) 
VAT Rate General rate at which most goods and services are taxed under the value 
added tax. Most countries have a variety of reduced rates for certain basic 
goods, such as basic foodstuffs, and have a zero rate on exported goods. 
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: Vegh & Vuletin (2015) 
Tax Revenue share of 
GDP 
It is total tax revenues, including both domestic taxes and customs duties, 
as percent of GDP. 
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: IMF’s WoRLD 
PIT share of GDP It is the level of PIT collections as percent of GDP. Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: IMF’s WoRLD 
CIT share of GDP It is the level of CIT collections as percent of GDP. Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes  
Database II: IMF’s WoRLD 
VAT share of GDP It is the level of net VAT collections as a percent of GDP. Values are net 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Database II: IMF’s WoRLD 
PIT share of Tax 
Revenue 
Computed as the ratio of PIT share of GDP over Tax Revenue share of 
GDP, multiplied by 100. 
Database I: Own calculations using 
USAID Collecting Taxes data 
PIT share of Tax 
Revenue 
Computed as the ratio of CIT share of GDP over Tax Revenue share of 
GDP, multiplied by 100. 
Database I: Own calculations using 
USAID Collecting Taxes data 
VAT share of Tax 
Revenue 
Computed as the ratio of VAT share of GDP over Tax Revenue share of 
GDP, multiplied by 100. 
Database I: Own calculations using 
USAID Collecting Taxes data 
Gini coefficient Measure of income inequality, computed as the ratio of the area between 
the line of equality (connecting the point denoting 0% of the cumulative 
share of population in the horizontal axis with the point of 100% of the 
cumulative share of income in the vertical axis) and the Lorenz curve, over 
the area below the line of equality. A Gini coefficient equal to 0 (100) 
represents perfect equality (inequality). 
Database I: World Income Inequality 
Database - WIID3.4 
Administration Costs 
(% of tax revenue) 
Cost of administering the tax system divided by total revenues collected by 
the tax administration, expressed in percentage points.  
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
SARA “1” if country has a semi-autonomous revenue agency (SARA). “0” 
otherwise.  
Database I: USAID Collecting Taxes 
Large Taxpayer Unit “1” means that the tax administrations has a division tending solely to the 
largest taxpayers. “0” means that the tax administration does not have such 
a division.  




Appendix 4. Tables Empirical Analysis 
 
Table 1A. Summary Statistics Database I (2008-2013) 
Income group: Full sample Low Lower-middle Upper-middle High 
 
Tables 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
               
GDP per capita (PPP) all below 749 (154) 17,213 16,393 508 91,817 196 (42) 2,458 190 (40) 8,764 168 (34) 17,388 195 (38) 40,125 
Population (millions) all below 749 (154) 40.0 146.1 0.1 1,362.5 196 (42) 47.2 190 (40) 63.5 168 (34) 24.7 195 (38) 23.1 
PIT Productivity 2A,2B 714 (144) 15.4 15.4 0.0 193.4 183 (39) 9.6 177 (39) 11.7 162 (32) 15.7 192 (34) 24.2 
CIT Productivity 2A,2B 714 (144) 13.6 12.1 0.0 86.0 183 (39) 8.5 177 (39) 15.4 162 (32) 13.9 192 (34) 16.5 
VAT Productivity 2A,2B 714 (144) 39.1 15.8 0.1 100.5 183 (39) 31.0 177 (39) 43.1 162 (32) 42.4 192 (34) 40.3 
PIT Maximum Rate 2A,2B 714 (144) 31.1 11.9 0.0 63.0 183 (39) 31.9 177 (39) 29.2 162 (32) 24.9 192 (34) 37.2 
CIT Rate 2A,2B 714 (144) 25.1 7.7 0.0 60.0 183 (39) 28.6 177 (39) 25.1 162 (32) 22.1 192 (34) 24.3 
VAT Rate 2A,2B 714 (144) 16.3 4.6 1.5 27.0 183 (39) 15.9 177 (39) 15.5 162 (32) 16.7 192 (34) 17.0 
Tax Adm. Costs (% of 𝑅) 3 362 (72) 1.3 1.1 0.1 7.4 31 (8) 3.13 73 (15) 1.37 96 (19) 1.15 162 (30) 1.10 
SARA 3 362 (72) 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 31 (8) 0.61 73 (15) 0.36 96 (19) 0.59 162 (30) 0.37 
Large Taxpayer Unit 3 362 (72) 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.0 31 (8) 0.68 73 (15) 0.93 96 (19) 0.95 162 (30) 0.80 
PIT share of Tax Revenue (%) 4A 152 (152) 20.2 12.6 0.0 86.4 40 (40) 16.6 42 (42) 17.8 34 (34) 15.6 36 (36) 31.4 
CIT share of Tax Revenue (%) 4A 152 (152) 18.0 13.2 0.0 81.4 40 (40) 16.6 42 (42) 21.3 34 (34) 17.5 36 (36) 16.1 
VAT share of Tax Revenue (%) 4A 152 (152) 19.5 7.1 7.7 44.7 40 (40) 14.5 42 (42) 18.1 34 (34) 21.2 36 (36) 25.2 
Gini coefficient 4A 135 (135) 38.7 9.1 23.5 64.8 36 (36) 39.9 39 (39) 42.3 26 (26) 40.6 34 (34) 31.6 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 4B 749 (154) 20.0 8.3 4.0 55.2 196 (42) 14.8 190 (40) 18.4 168 (34) 20.8 195 (38) 26.0 
PIT share of GDP (%) 4B 749 (154) 4.2 3.8 0.0 25.8 196 (42) 2.5 190 (40) 2.8 168 (34) 3.3 195 (38) 7.9 
CIT share of GDP (%) 4B 749 (154) 3.1 2.7 0.0 21.5 196 (42) 2.2 190 (40) 3.4 168 (34) 3.2 195 (38) 3.7 
VAT share of GDP (%) 4B 749 (154) 6.2 2.9 0.0 15.3 196 (42) 4.7 190 (40) 6.5 168 (34) 7.0 195 (38) 6.5 






Table 1B. Summary Statistics Database II (1990-2017) 
Income group: Full sample Low Lower-middle Upper-middle High 
 
Tables     Obs. 
 (countries) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
  Obs. 
 
(countries) Mean 
               
GDP per capita (PPP) all below 2,547 (140) 17,201 15,605 477 99,477 424 (36) 2,047 678 (38) 6,829 584 (31) 14,258 861 (35) 34,828 
Population (millions) all below 2,547 (140) 48.1 159.9 0.0 1,403.5 424 (36) 96.2 678 (38) 58.8 584 (31) 28.1 861 (35) 29.6 
PIT Productivity 2C 1,184 (58) 16.8 12.2 0.1 77.5 53 (5) 8.1 262 (16) 8.3 271 (14) 13.9 598 (23) 22.6 
CIT Productivity 2C 1,184 (58) 11.5 6.4 0.0 45.0 53 (5) 6.5 262 (16) 11.7 271 (14) 11.5 598 (23) 11.8 
VAT Productivity 2C 1,184 (58) 37.7 11.6 0.0 89.1 53 (5) 22.1 262 (16) 39.1 271 (14) 35.3 598 (23) 39.6 
PIT Maximum Rate 2C 1,184 (58) 36.4 12.1 10.0 68.0 53 (5) 31.0 262 (16) 28.5 271 (14) 30.2 598 (23) 43.2 
CIT Rate 2C 1,184 (58) 28.3 7.6 8.5 58.2 53 (5) 30.4 262 (16) 27.6 271 (14) 23.8 598 (23) 30.6 
VAT Rate 2C 1,184 (58) 16.7 5.0 3.0 27.0 53 (5) 15.5 262 (16) 14.0 271 (14) 18.9 598 (23) 17.1 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 4C 2,547 (140) 19.9 7.6 0.6 53.3 424 (36) 12.5 678 (38) 17.7 584 (31) 19.5 861 (35) 25.4 
PIT share of GDP (%) 4C 2,547 (140) 4.4 4.3 0.0 26.3 424 (36) 1.5 678 (38) 2.1 584 (31) 3.0 861 (35) 8.5 
CIT share of GDP (%) 4C 2,547 (140) 2.9 2.1 0.1 20.8 424 (36) 1.9 678 (38) 3.0 584 (31) 2.9 861 (35) 3.4 
VAT share of GDP (%) 4C 1,915 (121) 6.2 2.4 0.0 18.9 225 (28) 4.2 473 (33) 5.9 443 (29) 6.7 774 (31) 6.6 






Table 2A. Effects of Tax Rates and Development on Marginal Tax Revenue; Random-Effects GLS (Database I) 
Dependent variable: PIT Productivity CIT Productivity VAT Productivity 
Income level:  
Full 
sample 
Low Middle High 
Full 
sample 
Low Middle High 
Full 
sample 
Low Middle High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
PIT maximum rate -0.40** -0.32*** -0.23* -0.69** 0.00 0.11 0.14 -0.12* -0.01 -0.32 0.04 0.14 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.23) (0.16) (0.11) 
CIT rate 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.38 -0.49** -0.18** -0.68** -0.01 -0.25* -0.16 -0.30 -0.15 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) (0.24) (0.09) (0.34) (0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.25) (0.16) 
VAT rate 0.08 0.25 -0.37 1.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.35 -0.31 -1.03*** -1.14** -1.14** -0.61* 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.24) (0.91) (0.16) (0.20) (0.25) (0.43) (0.30) (0.51) (0.55) (0.35) 
Log of GDP per capita 3.14** 3.62 -1.95 21.31** 3.65*** 4.48** 1.39 8.33 -0.83 0.81 -5.93* -11.77** 
 (1.30) (2.77) (2.09) (9.00) (0.97) (1.80) (2.08) (7.41) (1.86) (5.41) (3.29) (4.78) 
Log of population -0.20 -0.99 0.67 0.31 -0.23 1.27 0.37 -0.68 -2.99*** -2.03 -3.42*** -2.48*** 
 (0.44) (0.84) (0.52) (1.31) (0.40) (0.96) (0.42) (1.44) (0.69) (2.42) (1.10) (0.74) 
East Asia & Pacific -11.28** 4.08 26.74 4.02 6.00** -38.72** 5.42 -2.24 -0.93 100.00* 7.71 3.16 
 (5.29) (20.94) (20.06) (14.09) (2.91) (19.14) (3.29) (4.11) (5.66) (54.50) (7.89) (4.38) 
Central Europe & Central Asia -9.85** 7.38 42.49** -5.16 -0.35 -43.69** 1.23 -4.50 3.09 101.20* 14.05* -3.19 
 (4.61) (19.51) (20.03) (5.91) (3.23) (18.46) (7.06) (5.51) (3.77) (56.15) (7.92) (3.70) 
Latin America & Caribbean -16.96*** 4.12 28.19 11.99 4.03 -47.31** 2.03 18.61 -0.75 92.89* 8.48** -9.05 
 (4.09) (19.27) (19.19) (9.99) (3.98) (18.55) (2.49) (20.60) (3.98) (53.15) (3.45) (10.35) 
Middle East & North Africa -15.03*** 1.31 28.79 2.31 8.80* -53.03*** 8.20 18.65 1.01 92.53* 8.09 13.73*** 
 (4.46) (21.20) (19.65) (7.57) (5.06) (19.07) (5.99) (13.39) (5.27) (55.82) (4.99) (4.17) 
South Asia -16.78*** 1.91 24.40 -- 4.66 -48.74** 0.00 -- -14.64** 82.84 0.00 -- 
 (5.05) (20.36) (18.92) -- (3.68) (20.63) (0.00) -- (6.44) (58.09) (0.00) -- 
Sub-Saharan Africa -9.17* 6.85 35.93* -- 7.96** -44.67** 9.76*** -- -10.84* 95.33* -1.08 -- 
 (4.79) (19.67) (19.24) -- (3.34) (19.06) (3.22) -- (6.23) (56.60) (5.94) -- 
Canada 8.84* -- -- 20.06 -3.68 -- -- -7.45 -6.43 -- -- 0.59 
 (5.17) -- -- (15.75) (2.54) -- -- (5.44) (4.75) -- -- (4.92) 
Constant 14.69 0.00 0.00 -196.27* -6.03 0.00 11.28 -51.40 122.25*** 0.00 168.23*** 214.07*** 
 (14.51) (0.00) (0.00) (102.39) (12.88) (0.00) (19.83) (100.25) (24.18) (0.00) (30.84) (62.42) 
             
Joint signif. tax rates, GDP & pop.             
Chi2 11.01 18.72 9.08 11.91 25.83 19.26 6.15 17.15 50.81 14.71 38.70 12.70 
Prob > chi2 0.0512 0.0022 0.1059 0.0361 0.0001 0.0017 0.2922 0.0042 0.0000 0.0117 0.0000 0.0263 
             
R-squared within 0.1409 0.2444 0.0857 0.2449 0.0624 0.0359 0.1379 0.0387 0.0485 0.2291 0.0496 0.0441 
R-squared between 0.4111 0.4656 0.3971 0.3292 0.2445 0.5338 0.1769 0.3569 0.3623 0.3497 0.3346 0.6036 
R-squared overall 0.3143 0.3865 0.2879 0.3217 0.1951 0.3928 0.1602 0.4436 0.2879 0.3768 0.2190 0.4132 
             
Observations 714 183 339 192 714 183 339 192 714 183 339 192 
Number of countries 144 39 71 34 144 39 71 34 144 39 71 34 













 (1) (2) (3) 
    
PIT maximum rate -0.33*** 0.03 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) 
CIT rate 0.13 -0.41*** -0.22** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) 
VAT rate 0.22 -0.12 -0.51** 
 (0.33) (0.12) (0.20) 
Log GDP per capita 1.83** 2.45*** -1.08 
 (0.79) (0.82) (1.39) 
Log GDP p.c. if low or lower-mid.inc. -0.07 0.35** 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.23) 
Log of population 0.06 -0.08 -1.55*** 
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.44) 
East Asia & Pacific -3.63 1.74 2.12 
 (4.05) (1.69) (3.22) 
Central Europe & Central Asia -7.40** -1.22 0.74 
 (3.13) (1.49) (2.37) 
Latin America & the Caribbean -6.61** 3.00 0.35 
 (3.26) (2.11) (2.37) 
Middle East & North Africa -4.83 4.92* 1.86 
 (3.44) (2.83) (3.08) 
South Asia -6.90* 2.68 -8.87** 
 (3.60) (2.02) (3.63) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2.56 5.07** -6.35 
 (2.96) (2.02) (4.00) 
Canada 4.37 -1.33 2.81 
 (5.76) (2.16) (3.13) 
Constant -2.10 2.80 78.12*** 
 (11.41) (7.85) (16.36) 
    
F test 754.24 23.44 27.84 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (Pr > z) -3.17 (0.002) -3.06 (0.002) -4.41 (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (Pr > z) 0.86 (0.391) 2.73 (0.006) 1.84 (0.066) 
    
Observations 579 588 585 
Number of countries  139 140 136 
Number of instruments 29 29 29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
PIT maximum rate -0.183*** 0.070*** -0.017 -0.184*** 0.074*** -0.015 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) (0.034) (0.023) (0.027) 
CIT rate 0.034** -0.122*** -0.034 0.036** -0.129*** -0.031 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.043) (0.017) (0.028) (0.042) 
VAT rate 0.042 0.022 -0.604*** 0.042 0.024 -0.597*** 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.142) (0.069) (0.072) (0.138) 
Growth GDP per capita -5.716** 14.796** 1.383 -- -- -- 
 (2.563) (5.810) (3.854) -- -- -- 
Growth GDP pc if low or lower-
mid.inc. 
6.925** -7.532 -1.047 -- -- -- 
 (2.737) (7.608) (11.527) -- -- -- 
Growth GDP pc if low income -3.176 -5.646 20.336 -- -- -- 
 (2.444) (5.315) (14.502) -- -- -- 
First diff. GDP pc (in thousands) -- -- -- -0.360** 1.296*** 0.176 
 -- -- -- (0.159) (0.328) (0.254) 
First diff. GDP pc squared -- -- -- 0.001 -0.008** -0.004* 
 -- -- -- (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
First diff. GDP pc if low or lower-
mid.inc. 
-- -- -- 0.538*** -0.090 -0.858 
 -- -- -- (0.194) (0.451) (0.911) 
First diff. GDP pc if low income -- -- -- -1.593*** 0.151 8.764*** 
 -- -- -- (0.469) (0.860) (2.451) 
Log of population 1.375 3.020 4.735** 1.078 3.863** 4.326* 
 (1.909) (1.965) (2.200) (1.796) (1.909) (2.191) 
Constant -14.318 -45.708 -53.333 -9.340 -59.702* -46.655 
 (31.217) (32.142) (35.110) (29.409) (31.322) (34.977) 
       
F 1,086.4 220.88 47.980 1,469.4 236.07 41.290 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
R-squared within 0.9220 0. 7388 0.6639 0.9226 0.7471 0.6676 
R-squared between 0.9224 0. 2410 0.3242 0.9405 0.1256 0.3811 
R-squared overall 0.9175 0. 3540 0.3766 0.9302 0.2264 0.4224 
       
Observations 1,138 1,143 1,126 1,138 1,143 1,126 
Number of countries 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  





Table 3. Determinants of Tax Collection Costs (Database I) 
Dependent variable: Tax collection costs (% of tax revenue) 
 Random-Effects GLS regressions 
Dynamic panel-data estimation 
(One-step System GMM) 
Income level:  Full sample 
Low and    
Lower-middle 
High and   
Upper-middle 
Full sample Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
      
Log of GDP per capita -0.54*** -1.27*** -0.08 -0.05** -0.09*** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.02) (0.03) 
Log of population -0.13** -0.17* -0.09 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) 
Semi-autonomous agency (dummy) 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.06** 0.06* 
 (0.05) (0.26) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Large taxpayer unit (dummy) -0.26 -1.90* -0.05 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.24) (1.15) (0.17) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant 8.82*** 17.30*** 3.45** 0.39 1.17** 
 (2.28) (3.02) (1.74) (0.53) (0.56) 
      
Wald chi2 26.07 63.21 12.11 3,514.91 6,470.95 
Prob > chi2 0.0020 0.0000 0.2072 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (Pr > z) -- -- -- -2.51 (0.012) -2.48 (0.013) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (Pr > z) -- -- -- 2.02 (0.044) 2.03 (0.042) 
      
R2 within 0.0022 0.0448 0.0232 -- -- 
R2 between 0.3069 0.6968 0.0687 -- -- 
R2 overall 0.3054 0.6284 0.0637 -- -- 
      
Observations 362 104 258 290 290 
Number of countries 72 23 49 62 62 
Number of instruments -- -- -- 16 23 
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
All regressions include year dummies (not shown). 







Table 4A. Effect of Development on Total Tax Revenue and Tax Revenue Composition (Cross-Country Analysis; Database I) 
Dependent variable: 
TAX share    
of GDP 
PIT share of 
Tax 
Revenue 
CIT share of 
Tax 
Revenue 
VAT share of 
Tax Revenue 
TAX share    
of GDP 
PIT share of 
Tax 
Revenue 
CIT share of 
Tax 
Revenue 
VAT share of 
Tax Revenue 
 (1.a) (2.a) (3.a) (4.a) (5.a) (6.a) (7.a) (8.a) 
         
Log GDP per capita  2.742*** 3.535*** 0.827 -2.005** 7.245*** 16.971*** 3.850 -7.639 
 (0.440) (0.860) (0.834) (0.874) (2.366) (3.781) (5.921) (4.726) 
Gini coefficient  -- -- -- -- 1.029* 3.064*** 0.619 -0.673 
 -- -- -- -- (0.583) (0.905) (1.659) (1.022) 
Interaction term (Log GDP pc × Gini) -- -- -- -- -0.131** -0.332*** -0.029 0.054 
 -- -- -- -- (0.063) (0.096) (0.174) (0.109) 
Log of population -1.117*** 1.381*** 0.673 -0.646 -1.177*** 1.362** 1.289** -1.743** 
 (0.212) (0.486) (0.541) (0.614) (0.279) (0.603) (0.552) (0.721) 
Constant 12.312** -34.129*** -0.319 59.430*** -21.718 -160.586*** -55.961 142.251*** 
 (5.656) (12.723) (10.916) (14.246) (22.973) (39.301) (58.151) (50.393) 
         
Observations (number of countries) 152 152 152 152 135 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.329 0.135 0.013 0.038 0.423 0.199 0.132 0.176 
 (1.b) (2.b) (3.b) (4.b) (5.b) (6.b) (7.b) (8.b) 
         
GDP pc (in thousands) 0.268** 0.289* 0.384 -0.487*** 0.732*** 1.130*** 0.288 -0.630 
 (0.104) (0.173) (0.327) (0.180) (0.178) (0.327) (0.376) (0.398) 
GDP pc (in thousands) squared -0.004*** -0.002 -0.002 0.003* -0.005*** -0.005** 0.000 0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gini coefficient  -- -- -- -- 0.168 0.461** 0.357 -0.326 
 -- -- -- -- (0.112) (0.187) (0.247) (0.236) 
Interaction term (GDP pc × Gini) -- -- -- -- -0.010** -0.015** -0.004 -0.003 
 -- -- -- -- (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Log of population -1.183*** 0.663 0.646 0.037 -1.033*** 0.636 0.807 -1.080* 
 (0.223) (0.474) (0.518) (0.603) (0.278) (0.567) (0.617) (0.631) 
East Asia & Pacific -8.486*** -4.757 17.092*** -10.097*** -5.606** -3.067 10.230*** -2.506 
 (2.342) (3.909) (4.479) (2.966) (2.511) (5.034) (3.397) (3.259) 
Central Europe & Central Asia -4.525** -10.994*** 5.740 4.069 -1.631 -7.684** 0.776 6.411* 
 (2.220) (3.018) (4.442) (3.170) (2.159) (3.433) (3.368) (3.395) 
Latin America & the Caribbean -8.727*** -8.990** 14.942*** -1.387 -7.628*** -8.290 4.280 7.464 
 (2.389) (3.852) (5.397) (3.604) (2.675) (5.056) (4.428) (4.725) 
Middle East & North Africa -8.047*** -0.252 23.486*** -9.855* -3.705 0.083 14.574*** -6.358 
 (2.791) (5.519) (8.058) (5.535) (2.788) (5.594) (5.179) (5.950) 
South Asia -12.886*** -11.898** 18.238** -15.431** -9.547*** -9.463 8.160 -8.822 
 (2.722) (4.916) (8.288) (7.617) (2.560) (5.744) (6.269) (7.089) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -8.024*** -5.433 15.066* -10.040** -4.676* -5.209 0.172 -0.626 
 (2.933) (4.476) (7.953) (4.307) (2.654) (5.287) (4.597) (5.102) 
United States & Canada -9.766*** 33.606** 1.321 -17.115*** -8.648** 34.643** 0.320 -10.782** 
 (3.721) (15.381) (4.793) (6.459) (4.265) (15.336) (5.551) (4.655) 
Constant 42.655*** 11.507 -9.668 41.376*** 29.711*** -12.895 -18.278 75.148*** 
 (4.657) (9.157) (10.386) (11.476) (7.014) (12.610) (15.660) (15.911) 
         
Observations (number of countries) 152 152 152 152 135 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.492 0.408 0.197 0.268 0.546 0.466 0.285 0.405 




Table 4B. Effect of Development on Total Tax Revenue and Tax Revenue Composition (Database I) 
Model: Random-Effects GLS regression 
Dynamic panel-data estimation  
(One-step System GMM) 
Dependent variable: 
TAX share      
of GDP 
PIT share         
of GDP 
CIT share        
of GDP 
VAT share      
of GDP 
TAX share      
of GDP 
PIT share         
of GDP 
CIT share        
of GDP 
VAT share      
of GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Log GDP per capita  1.38** 0.47 0.91*** -0.43 1.06* 0.43** 0.44** -0.27 
 (0.69) (0.32) (0.25) (0.34) (0.64) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) 
Log GDP p.c. if low or lower-mid.inc. -0.14 -0.12** 0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.05** -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Log of population -0.79*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.29** -0.67*** 0.05 0.00 -0.24** 
 (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.18) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) 
East Asia & Pacific -7.87*** -3.37*** 1.55** -3.21*** -6.12*** -1.77** 0.54 -1.68*** 
 (2.19) (1.25) (0.71) (0.72) (1.88) (0.77) (0.39) (0.57) 
Central Europe & Central Asia -3.74** -4.35*** -0.05 0.78 -3.66** -2.62*** -0.00 0.46 
 (1.82) (0.78) (0.60) (0.63) (1.54) (0.71) (0.16) (0.41) 
Latin America & the Caribbean -8.23*** -5.13*** 0.86 -2.07*** -6.40*** -2.56*** 0.46 -0.96* 
 (1.91) (0.88) (0.91) (0.70) (1.67) (0.99) (0.38) (0.50) 
Middle East & North Africa -6.33*** -4.31*** 1.31 -2.14** -4.93** -1.83** 1.03*** -0.82 
 (2.42) (1.02) (0.97) (1.07) (2.01) (0.86) (0.39) (0.61) 
South Asia -12.65*** -5.48*** 0.48 -5.40*** -10.10*** -2.85*** 0.35 -2.80*** 
 (2.23) (1.02) (0.97) (1.02) (2.04) (0.92) (0.31) (0.67) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -6.99*** -3.37*** 1.62* -3.56*** -5.61** -1.49* 0.87* -2.16*** 
 (2.56) (1.20) (0.89) (1.01) (2.29) (0.80) (0.45) (0.76) 
United States & Canada -9.86** 1.25 -0.97* -5.31*** -9.43*** 1.23** 0.10 -2.86*** 
 (4.30) (1.19) (0.51) (0.69) (2.72) (0.63) (0.23) (0.58) 
Constant 21.51*** 1.80 -5.25* 16.35*** 18.96*** -0.94 -2.29* 11.46*** 
 (7.92) (3.50) (2.97) (3.82) (6.98) (2.12) (1.35) (3.08) 
         
Joint significance test chi2 or F 209.17 212.02 48.75 213.55 325.72 886.44 452.80 1,777.60 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (Pr > z) -- -- -- -- -5.48(0.000) -3.45(0.001) -2.23(0.026) -4.06(0.000) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (Pr > z) -- -- -- -- -0.17(0.867) 2.14(0.032) 1.38(0.169) 1.90(0.057) 
         
R-squared within 0.0563 0.1407 0.0018 0.0120 -- -- -- -- 
R-squared between 0.4738 0.4805 0.1520 0.3903 -- -- -- -- 
R-squared overall 0.3668 0.3973 0.1374 0.3328 -- -- -- -- 
         
Observations 749 749 749 749 637 610 610 603 
Number of countries  154 154 154 154 149 146 145 141 
Number of instruments -- -- -- -- 26 26 26 26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  





Table 4C. Effect of Development on Total Tax Revenue and Tax Revenue Composition; Fixed-Effects (Database II) 






PIT share     
of GDP 








PIT share     
of GDP 




 (1.a) (2.a) (3.a) (4.a) (5.a) (6.a) (7.a) (8.a) (9.a) (10.a) 
           
Growth rate of GDP per capita  2.470 4.595** -0.239 2.136*** -0.397 6.688** 9.240** -0.786*** 2.187** -1.043 
      (1.512) (2.187) (0.268) (0.667) (0.407) (2.667) (4.267) (0.277) (0.942) (0.674) 
Growth rate of GDP pc if low income 1.080 -2.266 0.089 -1.793** 2.131 -3.156 -7.223* 0.524 -1.955** 2.350 
 (1.893) (2.322) (0.361) (0.765) (1.344) (2.910) (4.285) (0.355) (0.962) (1.589) 
Log of population -0.150 -0.672 0.193 -0.046 0.234 -0.906 -3.176*** -0.306 -0.948 0.621 
 (0.389) (0.668) (0.220) (0.377) (0.293) (0.693) (1.128) (0.302) (0.805) (0.659) 
Constant 6.975 15.974 -2.281 1.592 -1.616 18.646 57.692*** 5.477 16.616 -7.935 
 (6.323) (10.389) (3.515) (6.061) (4.692) (11.390) (18.748) (5.000) (13.362) (10.959) 
           
F 130.47 54.13 188.76 106.61 37.81 153.25 40.28 167.64 101.08 -- 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -- 
           
R-squared within 0.6505 0.6386 0.7379 0.6384 0.6258 0.7015 0.6503 0.7496 0.5913 0.6518 
R-squared between 0.9964 0.9509 0.9853 0.9674 0.9184 0.9293 0.6162 0.8679 0.2942 0.7591 
R-squared overall 0.9550 0.9239 0.9782 0.8770 0.8825 0.8860 0.5878 0.8539 0.3487 0.6622 
           
Observations 4,057 2,547 2,547 2,547 1,869 2,129 1,102 1,102 1,102 673 
Number of countries 166 140 140 140 119 91 74 74 74 59 
           
 (1.b) (2.b) (3.b) (4.b) (5.b) (6.b) (7.b) (8.b) (9.b) (10.b) 
           
First diff. GDP pc (in thousands) 0.109 0.298** -0.001 0.190** 0.003 2.154** 3.143** -0.181* 0.888** 0.039 
 (0.069) (0.132) (0.031) (0.076) (0.034) (0.887) (1.364) (0.097) (0.363) (0.212) 
First diff. GDP pc (in thousands) squared -0.001** -0.003** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.062* -0.119** 0.004 -0.028** -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.031) (0.048) (0.003) (0.012) (0.008) 
First diff. GDP pc if low income 0.642 0.408 -0.010 -0.124 0.962*** -0.958 -1.553 0.074 -0.652** 0.931** 
 (0.541) (0.387) (0.086) (0.186) (0.261) (0.837) (0.957) (0.103) (0.269) (0.367) 
Log of population -0.149 -0.658 0.173 0.004 0.162 -0.715 -3.412*** -0.344 -0.949 0.372 
 (0.356) (0.682) (0.220) (0.380) (0.290) (0.714) (1.178) (0.303) (0.805) (0.660) 
Constant 6.987 15.883 -1.949 0.776 -0.439 15.589 61.817*** 6.117 16.640 -3.818 
 (5.760) (10.643) (3.510) (6.114) (4.661) (11.729) (19.640) (5.021) (13.354) (10.953) 
           
F 131.25 48.97 192.64 130.64 40.87 154.05 43.78 142.20 92.63 -- 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -- 
           
R-squared within 0.6465 0.6344 0.7387 0.6389 0.6310 0.6995 0.6519 0.7496 0.5960 0.6593 
R-squared between 0.9964 0.9522 0.9878 0.9729 0.9487 0.9520 0.5893 0.8445 0.2931 0.9067 
R-squared overall 0.9547 0.9250 0.9801 0.8803 0.9116 0.9033 0.5605 0.8345 0.3485 0.8250 
           
Observations 4,057 2,547 2,547 2,547 1,869 2,129 1,102 1,102 1,102 673 
Number of countries 166 140 140 140 119 91 74 74 74 59 
           
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
All regressions include year dummies and an autoregressive term (not shown). 
 
